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JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
LA w. By Anthony D'Amato. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
1984. Pp. xiv, 334. $53.50. 
Any discussion of jurisprudence runs the risk of becoming a se-
mantic nightmare, with the labels and jargon of a particular theory 
clouding the real purposes of any truly useful analysis in this area. 
Any helpful examination of the "meaning of law" should be less con-
cerned with providing verbal formulae that hold true in all cases than 
with the actual functioning of the law and the symbiotic relationship 
between the law and the community that it serves. In Jurisprudence: 
A Descriptive and Normative Analysis of Law, Professor Anthony 
D' Amato1 adopts this type of functional approach in examining what 
is meant by "the law," placing his emphasis on, first, the way law can 
and should function within society and, second, the role morality must 
play as the underpinning of any legal system. 
Beyond his cogent and insightful legal mind, Professor D' Amato 
I. Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; A.B. 1958, Cornell; J.D. 1961, 
Harvard Law School; Ph.D. (Political Science) 1968, Columbia University. 
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brings to bis work an interest in politics, international law and justice, 
and science and technology. Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Norma-
tive Analysis of Law is a compilation of twelve essays written by Pro-
fessor D' Amato and published individually in various journals from 
1970 to 1982. Although each chapter stands individually, the book as 
a whole generally follows familiar format, beginning with a description 
of what the law is ("descriptive analysis"), and moving into an analysis 
of what the law ought to be ("normative analysis"). 
Professor D' Amato begins in Chapter One with a description of 
the contrasting approaches of legal realism and positivism. D' Amato 
describes American legal realism as 
a school of analysis that reached its height in the 1930s and is especially 
associated with the names of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Karl Llewellyn, 
and Jerome Frank. The realists tried to throw out all "legal reasoning" 
and the use of rules and principles as reasons for the decisions courts and 
agencies reach, claiming instead that decisionmakers decide cases ac-
cording to personal predilictions [sic], deep psychological needs, friend-
ships, calculations of personal advancement, and so forth. Accordingly, 
the realists claimed that students oflaw should study these latter motiva-
tions and not be concerned with traditional legal reasoning. [p. 5; foot-
note omitted] 
According to legal realism, then, the process of law involves a consid-
eration of all these various factors and makes a prediction as to the 
outcome of future official behavior, with this prediction affecting the 
present behavior of others (p. 8). 
In examining positivism, on the other hand, D' Amato looks pri-
marily at the work of H.L.A. Hart.2 According to D' Amato, this 
school of thought sees "law" as emanating from the workings of an 
, established framework: "Hart's concept of law posits the existence of 
a 'rule of recognition' that serves to identify officials, courts, the juris-
diction of courts, and the general system for the creation, modifica-
tion, and extinction of rules of law that directly affect the conduct of 
the average person's life" (p. 12; footnote omitted). All other rules of 
law derive their validity from these rules of recognition. Thus if a 
statement is made by the proper person or through the proper process, 
it is the law; there is no reason to consider any other factors. 
Arguing that "law" has to operate in the present, not retroactively, 
and must provide a context in which future legai results may be pre-
dicted in the present, D' Amato clearly favors the position of the legal 
realist over that of the positivist.3 Nevertheless, applying the two ap-
proaches to the context of the "grudge informer" cases in Nazi Ger-
many, D' Amato concludes that both positivism and legal realism 
come up short (pp. 46-50). He describes these cases as situations 
2. P. 5; see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
3. P. 27. D'Amato pays particular attention to refuting the attacks made against legal real· 
ism by the positivist Hart. See pp. 35-46. 
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where people were able to procure, through entirely personal motiva-
tions, the imprisonment or execution of their "enemies" by revealing 
to the authorities offenses against the regime, such as listening to short 
wave radio broadcasts from enemy countries. After the war, these in-
formers defended themselves on the ground that, although entirely 
personal in motivation, their actions were completely legal - indeed, 
were even patriotic - under the laws of the old regime. D' Amato 
declares that positivism fails to reach a proper result here, for it views 
the Nazi laws as valid because they emanated from the legal system 
then in control; although morally abhorrent, they cannot lawfully be 
.declared invalid at a later time (p. 47). 
But legal realism also has a problem with this situation, for the 
only way to predict, during the height of the Nazi regime, the eventual 
prosecution of a grudge informer would be to imagine a whole new set 
of officials, with different standards, taking over from the present rul-
ers (p. 49). If such a leadership change can be imagined in this con-
text, it can be imagined in any context, thus rendering the predictive 
element of legal realism always subject to the troubling caveat of a 
potential future change in standards. 
Professor D' Amato's solution to these problems rests on an idea 
that recurs throughout the book. In order to be effective predictors of 
future legal behavior, legal theories must have a strong basis in moral 
philosophy (p. 51). In this way there is a sense in which the grudge 
informer "knows" his conduct is morally wrong, and can at least sus-
pect that a future regime will impose retroactive sanctions against it. 
D' Amato claims that by ignoring this more objective and universal 
underlying standard, and instead viewing law only as emanating from 
particular "officials or ... regimes," both legal realism and positivism 
share a common failing (p. 50). However, although he claims that 
"the terrain for a normative theory of law remains largely uncharted" 
(p. 54 n.89), D' Amato does disappointingly little to show the exact 
role morality should play in the process of law. Nowhere in the book 
does D' Amato tell us how or by whom the rules of morality are to be 
chosen or provide an adequate discussion of potential conflicts be-
tween various moral concerns. 
Throughout Part One, D' Amato continues his discussion of the 
manner in which law can and should be able both to predict and affect 
future behavior. The idea that law is a prophecy of what courts do 
was first written by Justice Holmes,4 but, complains D'Amato, this 
notion was distorted by the American realist school, which equated 
law with the actual decisions of officials. 5 For D' Amato, the process of 
prediction is much more important than the decisions themselves, for 
4. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). 
5. P. 113; see, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 90-91 (1951); Frank, What Courts 
Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 657 (1932). 
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it is this process that can affect and modify human behavior. Further-
more, this process must necessarily produce decisions in the present, 
while people still have the opportunity to choose the correct behavior, 
rather than in the future (with retroactive application). Thus, the 
brunt of D' Amata's criticism falls on positivism, which, with its reli-
ance on present rules as a statement of what the law is, cannot accu-
rately predict the outcomes of "hard cases,'' where present rules are 
subject to future modification. 
In Chapter Four, "The domestic legal system: A cybernetic analy-
sis," Professor D'Amato provides an insightful look at the interactions 
and relationships among the various groups within a legal system. 
Tracing the positivist model from its roots in Thomas Hobbes' Levia-
than, through its development in the works of Jeremy Bentham and 
John Austin, to the modem contributions of Hart, D' Amato con-
cludes that the workings of a legal system cannot be completely de-
fined through established rules, for real-world examples provide a 
variety that goes well beyond the definitional abilities of language (p. 
151). D'Amato instead turns to what he calls a "naturalist" model to 
provide a more accurate picture of the processes in a legal system. In 
this model, the legislature, the citizen/litigant, and the courts all share 
in both the input and output of each other's group (pp. 144-45). With 
each group within the system both affecting and affected by every 
other group, the system controls itself; there is no outside authority 
establishing rules or providing control (p. 153). 
After this general overview of the legal system, the next three 
chapters digress into more specific areas of interest to D' Amato. 
Chapter Five examines the possibilities of computerizing certain as-
pects of the judicial process, while Chapters Six and Seven look to the 
international arena for a specific context in which to examine the ideas 
discussed earlier. While interesting, these three essays betray their ori-
gin: they are separate and distinct articles, published twelve years 
apart. The idea apparently was to provide specific examples of, and a 
context for, the discussion in the preceding chapters; instead, these 
three chapters do not serve to advance any particular theory or argu-
ment in the work, but rather seem to have been arbitrarily placed at 
the end of Part One. 
Part Two of Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis 
of Law centers on normative considerations, which, according to 
D' Amato, necessarily involve recognizing the fundamental relation-
ship between what the law is and what it ought to be (p. 224). An 
examination of the is and the ought, and the relationship between the 
two, has been a cornerstone of jurisprudential thought since the time 
of David Hume. But D' Amato is not concerned with defining the 
ought, as a typical "normative analysis" might do; rather, he centers 
his discussion on the way the factual world and the moral world oper-
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ate together in the legal process. In this way his normative analysis is 
consistent with his descriptive analysis, in that both view a legal sys-
tem as one that must operate in the present, with the constituent parts 
interacting to mold the future. This shared feature in the discussion of 
what the law is and what it ought to be is one of the stronger aspects of 
the book. 
D' Amato undertakes his normative analysis through an examina-
tion of the legal process at work in specific situations. He devotes one 
chapter to a look at the dilemma facing Socrates in deciding whether 
to escape from prison, and from his society, in order to avoid death 
(pp. 228-58). Another chapter reopens the famous case of the 
Speluncean Explorers, 6 and provides three new opinions concerning 
whether the convicted defendants are entitled to executive clemency 
(pp. 304-27). Nearly forty years ago Professor Lon Fuller provided 
the original five opinions in his hypothetical future case, which in-
volved the fate of four defendants who, after being trapped in an un-
derground cave for three weeks, elected to kill and eat the flesh of a 
fifth member of their party in order to survive until rescue workers 
could reach them. D'Amato's opinions, like Fuller's, do not claim to 
answer the questions presented. Instead, D' Amato focuses on the con-
flicting ways that law can function in a society, particularly on the 
differences that arise when the goals of law are centered on the group · 
and when they are centered on the individual. D' Amato is probably 
most sympathetic to his third opinion, which argues that the member 
of the group that was killed shared in the guilt of the others because he 
tried, too late in the game, to withdraw from the group, thus attempt-
ing to save himself without incurring any risk. This opinion argues 
that the other four were not completely innocent either, but instead of 
dying for their wrong they should be required to perform some type of 
community service, thereby helping the lives of others. 
D' Amato also shows his interest in the international sphere in 
three different chapters (two in Part One and one in Part Two), com-
paring the functioning of the legal process in different nations and so-
cieties. In Chapter Nine, he uses the international context to criticize 
the theories of Professor John Rawls, 7 concluding that any system that 
treats the aggregate groups (that is, the states) as equals will inevitably 
conflict with individual human rights (p. 273). This elevation of the 
claims of the state over those of the individual is the same criticism 
made by D' Amato of Socrates' decision to die rather than protest his 
sentence (p. 253). D' Amato is not, however, arguing for radical indi-
vidualism; rather, in his model of the legal system the individual, like 
the legislature and the judiciary, has a role to play in predicting and 
shaping the results of the legal process. D' Amato emphasizes that the 
6. See Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
7. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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input of the individual is crucial to this process, and must not be 
dwarfed by concerns of the group. One of the main reasons for this 
seems to be that moral philosophy must establish a foundation under-
lying the process of interaction among all members of the system in 
order to produce law (p. 279). And presumably, although D' Amato 
never makes this point clear, morality's objectivity should initially and 
fundamentally affect the actions and reactions of each individual. 
While these examinations of legal systems at work in specific situa-
tions tend to be interesting and insightful, they also point to the major 
weakness of the work, a weakness that is perhaps inevitable given the 
genesis of the book. Originally written as twelve separate essays, the 
chapters come together to contribute to a theory that tends to move 
forwar4 at an uneven and awkward pace. Indeed, several chapters do 
not seem to advance any theory at all, but rather go down the side 
roads of D' Amato's varied interests. Rather than clarifying the over-
all picture of the operation of a legal system, the discussion of the 
potential for computerizing part of the legal process leaves the reader 
wondering why an entire chapter was devoted to an area that seems to 
be nothing more than a sidelight. To a degree, each chapter merely 
provides a new context in which D' Amato can express the same basic 
ideas. 
In a sense, of course, part of this criticism is unfair because one of 
the underpinnings of D' Amato's theory is that language cannot pre-
scribe rules, or a theory, that will hold true in all cases. Rather, differ-
ent circumstances and experiences give rise to the evolution of 
different rules and different aspects of a theory. Unfortunately, Juris-
prudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis of Law is not a mo-
saic, with the various pieces coming together to form a comprehensive 
whole. Instead, in both structure and proofreading, the book seems to 
be the result of a hurried race to publish; little effort was made to 
blend the ideas presented in the individual chapters. As a result, the 
reader is intrigued by the various ideas and insights that flash across 
the pages, but is left disappointed that they lack a common thread 
tying them together. Perhaps there are no correct answers to the 
broad questions of what law is and ought to be. What a book that 
addresses those questions needs, however, and what Professor 
D' Amato fails to provide, is a more uniform and comprehensive ana-
lytic context. 
- Christopher P. Portman 
